Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations

On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:
Lulling:

In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred
after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See
also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after
the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse
impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the
purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where
salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from
businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull
them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that
such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the
fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions
that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security,
postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).*

Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to
divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will
easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court.



Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers
here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the
shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim.

"It is the scheme to defraud and not actual fraud that is required."
United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1976). "No
particular type of victim is required . . . nor need the scheme have
succeeded." United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302-03 n. 43
(D.C. Cir. 1984). No actual loss to the victims is required. See United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.) ("The fraud statutes
speak alternatively of devising or intending to devise a scheme to
defraud and do not require that the deception bear fruit for the
wrongdoer or cause injury to the intended victim as a prerequisite to
successful prosecution. [S]uccess of the scheme and loss by a defrauded
person are not essential elements of the crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343 . . . ."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); see also United
States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The amount of
money realized as a result of the scheme is not an essential element of
mail fraud. It was not even necessary to prove that the scheme succeeded.").
For a discussion of fraud loss computation in sentencing see Guidelines
Sentencing (Federal Judicial Center, 1997), Section II.D.2. Offense
Involving Fraud and Deceit.
"[i]t makes no difference whether the persons the scheme is intended to
defraud are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright . . . . " United
States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
919 (1980)). "[T]he monumental credulity of the victim is no shield for
the accused . . ." Id. (quoting Deaver v. United States, 155 F.2d 740,
744-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 766 (1946)); cf. Pollack, 534
F.2d at 971 (To hold that actual loss to victim is required "would lead
to the illogical result that the legality of a defendant's conduct would
depend on his fortuitous choice of a gullible victim.") (quoted in
Maxwell, 920 F.2d at 1036).

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/fo...9/crm00943.htm


IMO, Lance is toast once the initial use of PEDs is proven in
relationship to obtaining money from the Postal Service.

On Nov 1, 9:00*am, BLafferty wrote:
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:



Lulling:

In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred
after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See
also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after
the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse
impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the
purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where
salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from
businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull
them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that
such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the
fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions
that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security,
postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).*

Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to
divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will
easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court.

Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers
here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the
shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim.

I asked for a case in which the public protestation of
innocence was interpreted as a material part of the
conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute
of limitations. These examples don't show that. A
mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting
a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's
hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation
as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud.
A private assurance from Madoff that the business
was on the up and up could also be a significant part
of his conspiracy.

However, these are distinct from a public utterance
of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded
entity. Precedent for the use of that as a critical element
of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit.

Fredmaster Ben
[i]
* "It is the scheme to defraud and not actual fraud that is required."
United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1976). "No
particular type of victim is required . . . nor need the scheme have
succeeded." United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302-03 n. 43
(D.C. Cir. 1984). No actual loss to the victims is required. See United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.) ("The fraud statutes
speak alternatively of devising or intending to devise a scheme to
defraud and do not require that the deception bear fruit for the
wrongdoer or cause injury to the intended victim as a prerequisite to
successful prosecution. [S]uccess of the scheme and loss by a defrauded
person are not essential elements of the crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343 . . . ."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); see also United
States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The amount of
money realized as a result of the scheme is not an essential element of
mail fraud. It was not even necessary to prove that the scheme succeeded.").
For a discussion of fraud loss computation in sentencing see Guidelines
Sentencing (Federal Judicial Center, 1997), Section II.D.2. Offense
Involving Fraud and Deceit.
"t makes no difference whether the persons the scheme is intended to
defraud are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright . . . . " United
States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
919 (1980)). "[T]he monumental credulity of the victim is no shield for
the accused . . ." Id. (quoting Deaver v. United States, 155 F.2d 740,
744-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 766 (1946)); cf. Pollack, 534
F.2d at 971 (To hold that actual loss to victim is required "would lead
to the illogical result that the legality of a defendant's conduct would
depend on his fortuitous choice of a gullible victim.") (quoted in
Maxwell, 920 F.2d at 1036).

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/fo...m/title9/crm00...

IMO, Lance is toast once the initial use of PEDs is proven in
relationship to obtaining money from the Postal Service.

On 11/1/2010 2:50 PM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 9:00 am, wrote:
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:



Lulling:

In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred
after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See
also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after
the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse
impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the
purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where
salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from
businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull
them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that
such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the
fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions
that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security,
postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).*

Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to
divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will
easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court.

Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers
here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the
shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim.

I asked for a case in which the public protestation of
innocence was interpreted as a material part of the
conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute
of limitations. These examples don't show that. A
mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting
a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's
hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation
as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud.
A private assurance from Madoff that the business
was on the up and up could also be a significant part
of his conspiracy.

Are you truly dumb as a post? Let me paraphrase the precedent announced
by the Supreme Court so that you may more readily apprehend its meaning.

"Thus, post-procurement of multi-year sponsorship
electronic(wire)transmissions to web sites, blogs, text messages, emails
etc. that were designed to *lull* the victim into a false sense of
security, *postpone inquiries or complaints*, or make the transaction
less suspect are in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers,
9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).

However, these are distinct from a public utterance
of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded
entity. Precedent for the use of that as a critical element
of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit.

We are addressing "public" lulling statements of innocence transmitted
in furtherance of the mail/wire fraud scheme to defraud.

On 11/1/2010 4:56 PM, BLafferty wrote:
On 11/1/2010 2:50 PM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 9:00 am, wrote:
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:



Lulling:

In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred
after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute.
See
also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after
the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse
impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the
purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where
salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from
businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to
lull
them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held
that
such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the
fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions
that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security,
postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).*

Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to
divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will
easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court.

Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers
here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the
shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim.

I asked for a case in which the public protestation of
innocence was interpreted as a material part of the
conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute
of limitations. These examples don't show that. A
mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting
a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's
hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation
as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud.
A private assurance from Madoff that the business
was on the up and up could also be a significant part
of his conspiracy.

Are you truly dumb as a post? Let me paraphrase the precedent announced
by the Supreme Court so that you may more readily apprehend its meaning.

"Thus, post-procurement of multi-year sponsorship
electronic(wire)transmissions to web sites, blogs, text messages, emails
etc. that were designed to *lull* the victim into a false sense of
security, *postpone inquiries or complaints*, or make the transaction
less suspect are in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers,
9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).

However, these are distinct from a public utterance
of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded
entity. Precedent for the use of that as a critical element
of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit.

We are addressing "public" lulling statements of innocence transmitted
in furtherance of the mail/wire fraud scheme to defraud.

I would add that the "donation" to the UCI can be interpreted as a
lulling act (an act which used the banking system's electronic
transmission system) as are email and text transmissions to cycling
authorities and the cycling press.

On Nov 1, 10:00*am, BLafferty wrote:

IMO, Lance is toast ....

IOHO, we ALL knew what YOU thought.
Thanks for the cites. I'll take a look if the urge arises and I have
time.
DR

On Nov 1, 2:50*pm, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 9:00*am, BLafferty wrote:
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:

Lulling:

In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred
after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See
also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after
the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse
impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the
purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where
salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from
businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull
them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that
such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the
fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions
that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security,
postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).*

Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to
divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will
easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court.

Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers
here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the
shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim.

I asked for a case in which the public protestation of
innocence was interpreted as a material part of the
conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute
of limitations. *These examples don't show that.

Are you for real?! Please don't discourage L'enema from posting his
obsession research. It is ever so much more enjoyable than his usual
knee-jerk - or is it just jerking? - posting of puerile links that
allow him to play holier than thou while self-flagellating his demonic
digit to that picture of LANCE naked on his bike.

So please, encourage the boy.

R

On Nov 1, 1:56*pm, BLafferty wrote:
On 11/1/2010 2:50 PM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 9:00 am, *wrote:
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:

Lulling:

In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred
after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See
also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after
the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse
impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the
purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where
salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from
businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull
them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that
such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the
fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions
that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security,
postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).*

Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to
divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will
easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court..

Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers
here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the
shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim..

I asked for a case in which the public protestation of
innocence was interpreted as a material part of the
conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute
of limitations. *These examples don't show that. *A
mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting
a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's
hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation
as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud.
A private assurance from Madoff that the business
was on the up and up could also be a significant part
of his conspiracy.

Are you truly dumb as a post? Let me paraphrase the precedent announced
by the Supreme Court so that you may more readily apprehend its meaning.

"Thus, post-procurement of multi-year sponsorship
electronic(wire)transmissions to web sites, blogs, text messages, emails
etc. that were designed to *lull* the victim into a false sense of
security, *postpone inquiries or complaints*, or make the transaction
less suspect are in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers,
9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).

Wait a second. Please don't begin paraphrases with
double quote marks and end them with a citation. As is
easily verifiable, U.S. v. Rogers contains no mention of
sponsorships, web sites, blogs, text messages or emails,
which is not surprising since it's from 1993. Your case might
be stronger if you stuck with the direct quote from the ruling
that you gave earlier.

Also if I have this right, cert was denied by the Supreme Court
so the precedent is from the 2nd Circuit, which doesn't really
matter (apart from the issue of precedents across different
circuits) - except that it's another detail you seem to be
exaggerating to make the case.

However, these are distinct from a public utterance
of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded
entity. *Precedent for the use of that as a critical element
of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit.

We are addressing "public" lulling statements of innocence transmitted
in furtherance of the mail/wire fraud scheme to defraud.

Hmm. From the case cited above

http://openjurist.org/9/f3d/1025/uni...tes-v-e-rogers

Paragraphs 17 through 19 are probably of interest here.

I'll quote paragraph 19, citing the Supreme Court in
Grunewald v. U.S.

353 U.S. at 397, 77 S.Ct. at 970 (footnote omitted).
Grunewald noted that "a vital distinction must be made
between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main
criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment
done after these central objectives have been attained, for the
purpose only of covering up after the crime." Id. at 405, 77
S.Ct. at 974 (emphasis in original). "Thus, the life of a
conspiracy cannot be extended for statute of limitations
purposes by acts of concealment occurring after the conspiracy's
criminal objectives have been fully accomplished even if
those acts are 'done in the context of a mutually understood
need for secrecy.' " United States v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495,
499 (2d Cir.) (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402, 77 S.Ct. at
972), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 67, 116 L.Ed.2d 41
(1991).

This is followed by paragraph 20 which contains
this sentence:

In the context of wire fraud, the Supreme Court has stated
that mailings occurring after the receipt of goods obtained by
fraud are within the statute if those mailings were designed
"to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone
their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore
make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than
if no mailings had taken place."

Interesting. In the context of U.S. v. Rogers, it's clear the
lulling communications were designed to reassure the
creditor that it would be paid eventually, that is as a
promise of some future action. It's not clear to me that
is a good analogy for the Armstrong situation.
Do you think Armstrong's protestations of innocence
during 2004-2010 will be viewed as having been designed to
postpone fraud complaints from the US Postal Service?
If so Armstrong must be a very prescient man, as before
2010 I think hardly anyone but he would have realized that
fraud charges were even a possibility.

I think this one will have to be argued by real lawyers; so far
your examples are not to the point of my question.

Fredmaster Ben
is not accredited to give legal advice on the Internets

BLafferty wrote:
IMO, Lance is toast

Did he always fall on the buttered side until he broke his collar bone ?

On 11/2/2010 3:58 AM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 1:56 pm, wrote:
On 11/1/2010 2:50 PM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 9:00 am, wrote:
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:

Lulling:

In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred
after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See
also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after
the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse
impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the
purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where
salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from
businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull
them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that
such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the
fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions
that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security,
postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).*

Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to
divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will
easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court.

Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers
here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the
shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim.

I asked for a case in which the public protestation of
innocence was interpreted as a material part of the
conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute
of limitations. These examples don't show that. A
mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting
a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's
hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation
as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud.
A private assurance from Madoff that the business
was on the up and up could also be a significant part
of his conspiracy.

Are you truly dumb as a post? Let me paraphrase the precedent announced
by the Supreme Court so that you may more readily apprehend its meaning.

"Thus, post-procurement of multi-year sponsorship
electronic(wire)transmissions to web sites, blogs, text messages, emails
etc. that were designed to *lull* the victim into a false sense of
security, *postpone inquiries or complaints*, or make the transaction
less suspect are in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers,
9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).

Wait a second. Please don't begin paraphrases with
double quote marks and end them with a citation. As is
easily verifiable, U.S. v. Rogers contains no mention of
sponsorships, web sites, blogs, text messages or emails,
which is not surprising since it's from 1993. Your case might
be stronger if you stuck with the direct quote from the ruling
that you gave earlier.

LOL! The law rolls off your back like water off a duck.


Also if I have this right, cert was denied by the Supreme Court
so the precedent is from the 2nd Circuit, which doesn't really
matter (apart from the issue of precedents across different
circuits) - except that it's another detail you seem to be
exaggerating to make the case.

And your inane point is? The citation notes that cert. was denied.
There is no representation in the case citation that the Supreme Court
decided the case on its merits. As for precedent, only the circuit
making the ruling is bound by the decision as precedent, unless the
appeal to the Supreme Court was automatic, in which case cert. denied is
binding as precedent across all circuits. But, you knew that.


However, these are distinct from a public utterance
of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded
entity. Precedent for the use of that as a critical element
of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit.

We are addressing "public" lulling statements of innocence transmitted
in furtherance of the mail/wire fraud scheme to defraud.

Hmm. From the case cited above

http://openjurist.org/9/f3d/1025/uni...tes-v-e-rogers

Paragraphs 17 through 19 are probably of interest here.

I'll quote paragraph 19, citing the Supreme Court in
Grunewald v. U.S.

353 U.S. at 397, 77 S.Ct. at 970 (footnote omitted).
Grunewald noted that "a vital distinction must be made
between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main
criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment
done after these central objectives have been attained, for the
purpose only of covering up after the crime." Id. at 405, 77
S.Ct. at 974 (emphasis in original). "Thus, the life of a
conspiracy cannot be extended for statute of limitations
purposes by acts of concealment occurring after the conspiracy's
criminal objectives have been fully accomplished even if
those acts are 'done in the context of a mutually understood
need for secrecy.' " United States v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495,
499 (2d Cir.) (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402, 77 S.Ct. at
972), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 67, 116 L.Ed.2d 41
(1991).

This is followed by paragraph 20 which contains
this sentence:

In the context of wire fraud, the Supreme Court has stated
that mailings occurring after the receipt of goods obtained by
fraud are within the statute if those mailings were designed
"to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone
their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore
make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than
if no mailings had taken place."

Interesting. In the context of U.S. v. Rogers, it's clear the
lulling communications were designed to reassure the
creditor that it would be paid eventually, that is as a
promise of some future action. It's not clear to me that
is a good analogy for the Armstrong situation.
Do you think Armstrong's protestations of innocence
during 2004-2010 will be viewed as having been designed to
postpone fraud complaints from the US Postal Service?
If so Armstrong must be a very prescient man, as before
2010 I think hardly anyone but he would have realized that
fraud charges were even a possibility.

I think this one will have to be argued by real lawyers; so far
your examples are not to the point of my question.

It isn't often in the practice of law that one finds a case on all fours
with the one being considered. Hence, the argument above that has so
easily rolled off your back. Frankly, your stupidity is at an amazingly
high level, even for a non-attorney such as you are.



Fredmaster Ben
is not accredited to give legal advice on the Internets

On 11/2/2010 12:02 AM, RicodJour wrote:
On Nov 1, 2:50 pm, Fredmaster of wrote:
On Nov 1, 9:00 am, wrote:
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:

Lulling:

In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred
after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See
also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d
556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after
the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse
impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the
purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where
salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from
businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull
them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that
such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the
fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions
that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security,
postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).*

Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to
divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will
easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court.

Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers
here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the
shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim.

I asked for a case in which the public protestation of
innocence was interpreted as a material part of the
conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute
of limitations. These examples don't show that.

Are you for real?! Please don't discourage L'enema from posting his
obsession research. It is ever so much more enjoyable than his usual
knee-jerk - or is it just jerking? - posting of puerile links that
allow him to play holier than thou while self-flagellating his demonic
digit to that picture of LANCE naked on his bike.

So please, encourage the boy.

R
You really do have a hard on, RICO. If it lasts more than four hours,
seek medical assistance.