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#21
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote:
Lulling: In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).* Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court. Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim. "It is the scheme to defraud and not actual fraud that is required." United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1976). "No particular type of victim is required . . . nor need the scheme have succeeded." United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302-03 n. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1984). No actual loss to the victims is required. See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.) ("The fraud statutes speak alternatively of devising or intending to devise a scheme to defraud and do not require that the deception bear fruit for the wrongdoer or cause injury to the intended victim as a prerequisite to successful prosecution. [S]uccess of the scheme and loss by a defrauded person are not essential elements of the crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 . . . ."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); see also United States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The amount of money realized as a result of the scheme is not an essential element of mail fraud. It was not even necessary to prove that the scheme succeeded."). For a discussion of fraud loss computation in sentencing see Guidelines Sentencing (Federal Judicial Center, 1997), Section II.D.2. Offense Involving Fraud and Deceit. "[i]t makes no difference whether the persons the scheme is intended to defraud are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright . . . . " United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980)). "[T]he monumental credulity of the victim is no shield for the accused . . ." Id. (quoting Deaver v. United States, 155 F.2d 740, 744-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 766 (1946)); cf. Pollack, 534 F.2d at 971 (To hold that actual loss to victim is required "would lead to the illogical result that the legality of a defendant's conduct would depend on his fortuitous choice of a gullible victim.") (quoted in Maxwell, 920 F.2d at 1036). http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/fo...9/crm00943.htm IMO, Lance is toast once the initial use of PEDs is proven in relationship to obtaining money from the Postal Service. |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On Nov 1, 9:00*am, BLafferty wrote:
On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote: Lulling: In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).* Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court. Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim. I asked for a case in which the public protestation of innocence was interpreted as a material part of the conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute of limitations. These examples don't show that. A mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud. A private assurance from Madoff that the business was on the up and up could also be a significant part of his conspiracy. However, these are distinct from a public utterance of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded entity. Precedent for the use of that as a critical element of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit. Fredmaster Ben [i] * "It is the scheme to defraud and not actual fraud that is required." United States v. Reid, 533 F.2d 1255, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1976). "No particular type of victim is required . . . nor need the scheme have succeeded." United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302-03 n. 43 (D.C. Cir. 1984). No actual loss to the victims is required. See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.) ("The fraud statutes speak alternatively of devising or intending to devise a scheme to defraud and do not require that the deception bear fruit for the wrongdoer or cause injury to the intended victim as a prerequisite to successful prosecution. [S]uccess of the scheme and loss by a defrauded person are not essential elements of the crime under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 . . . ."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); see also United States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The amount of money realized as a result of the scheme is not an essential element of mail fraud. It was not even necessary to prove that the scheme succeeded."). For a discussion of fraud loss computation in sentencing see Guidelines Sentencing (Federal Judicial Center, 1997), Section II.D.2. Offense Involving Fraud and Deceit. "t makes no difference whether the persons the scheme is intended to defraud are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright . . . . " United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980)). "[T]he monumental credulity of the victim is no shield for the accused . . ." Id. (quoting Deaver v. United States, 155 F.2d 740, 744-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 766 (1946)); cf. Pollack, 534 F.2d at 971 (To hold that actual loss to victim is required "would lead to the illogical result that the legality of a defendant's conduct would depend on his fortuitous choice of a gullible victim.") (quoted in Maxwell, 920 F.2d at 1036). http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/fo...m/title9/crm00... IMO, Lance is toast once the initial use of PEDs is proven in relationship to obtaining money from the Postal Service. |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On 11/1/2010 2:50 PM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 9:00 am, wrote: On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote: Lulling: In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).* Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court. Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim. I asked for a case in which the public protestation of innocence was interpreted as a material part of the conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute of limitations. These examples don't show that. A mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud. A private assurance from Madoff that the business was on the up and up could also be a significant part of his conspiracy. Are you truly dumb as a post? Let me paraphrase the precedent announced by the Supreme Court so that you may more readily apprehend its meaning. "Thus, post-procurement of multi-year sponsorship electronic(wire)transmissions to web sites, blogs, text messages, emails etc. that were designed to *lull* the victim into a false sense of security, *postpone inquiries or complaints*, or make the transaction less suspect are in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994). However, these are distinct from a public utterance of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded entity. Precedent for the use of that as a critical element of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit. We are addressing "public" lulling statements of innocence transmitted in furtherance of the mail/wire fraud scheme to defraud. |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On 11/1/2010 4:56 PM, BLafferty wrote:
On 11/1/2010 2:50 PM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote: On Nov 1, 9:00 am, wrote: On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote: Lulling: In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).* Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court. Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim. I asked for a case in which the public protestation of innocence was interpreted as a material part of the conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute of limitations. These examples don't show that. A mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud. A private assurance from Madoff that the business was on the up and up could also be a significant part of his conspiracy. Are you truly dumb as a post? Let me paraphrase the precedent announced by the Supreme Court so that you may more readily apprehend its meaning. "Thus, post-procurement of multi-year sponsorship electronic(wire)transmissions to web sites, blogs, text messages, emails etc. that were designed to *lull* the victim into a false sense of security, *postpone inquiries or complaints*, or make the transaction less suspect are in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994). However, these are distinct from a public utterance of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded entity. Precedent for the use of that as a critical element of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit. We are addressing "public" lulling statements of innocence transmitted in furtherance of the mail/wire fraud scheme to defraud. I would add that the "donation" to the UCI can be interpreted as a lulling act (an act which used the banking system's electronic transmission system) as are email and text transmissions to cycling authorities and the cycling press. |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On Nov 1, 10:00*am, BLafferty wrote:
IMO, Lance is toast .... IOHO, we ALL knew what YOU thought. Thanks for the cites. I'll take a look if the urge arises and I have time. DR |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On Nov 1, 2:50*pm, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 9:00*am, BLafferty wrote: On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote: Lulling: In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).* Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court. Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim. I asked for a case in which the public protestation of innocence was interpreted as a material part of the conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute of limitations. *These examples don't show that. Are you for real?! Please don't discourage L'enema from posting his obsession research. It is ever so much more enjoyable than his usual knee-jerk - or is it just jerking? - posting of puerile links that allow him to play holier than thou while self-flagellating his demonic digit to that picture of LANCE naked on his bike. So please, encourage the boy. R |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On Nov 1, 1:56*pm, BLafferty wrote:
On 11/1/2010 2:50 PM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote: On Nov 1, 9:00 am, *wrote: On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote: Lulling: In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).* Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court.. Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim.. I asked for a case in which the public protestation of innocence was interpreted as a material part of the conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute of limitations. *These examples don't show that. *A mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud. A private assurance from Madoff that the business was on the up and up could also be a significant part of his conspiracy. Are you truly dumb as a post? Let me paraphrase the precedent announced by the Supreme Court so that you may more readily apprehend its meaning. "Thus, post-procurement of multi-year sponsorship electronic(wire)transmissions to web sites, blogs, text messages, emails etc. that were designed to *lull* the victim into a false sense of security, *postpone inquiries or complaints*, or make the transaction less suspect are in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994). Wait a second. Please don't begin paraphrases with double quote marks and end them with a citation. As is easily verifiable, U.S. v. Rogers contains no mention of sponsorships, web sites, blogs, text messages or emails, which is not surprising since it's from 1993. Your case might be stronger if you stuck with the direct quote from the ruling that you gave earlier. Also if I have this right, cert was denied by the Supreme Court so the precedent is from the 2nd Circuit, which doesn't really matter (apart from the issue of precedents across different circuits) - except that it's another detail you seem to be exaggerating to make the case. However, these are distinct from a public utterance of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded entity. *Precedent for the use of that as a critical element of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit. We are addressing "public" lulling statements of innocence transmitted in furtherance of the mail/wire fraud scheme to defraud. Hmm. From the case cited above http://openjurist.org/9/f3d/1025/uni...tes-v-e-rogers Paragraphs 17 through 19 are probably of interest here. I'll quote paragraph 19, citing the Supreme Court in Grunewald v. U.S. 353 U.S. at 397, 77 S.Ct. at 970 (footnote omitted). Grunewald noted that "a vital distinction must be made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime." Id. at 405, 77 S.Ct. at 974 (emphasis in original). "Thus, the life of a conspiracy cannot be extended for statute of limitations purposes by acts of concealment occurring after the conspiracy's criminal objectives have been fully accomplished even if those acts are 'done in the context of a mutually understood need for secrecy.' " United States v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir.) (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402, 77 S.Ct. at 972), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 67, 116 L.Ed.2d 41 (1991). This is followed by paragraph 20 which contains this sentence: In the context of wire fraud, the Supreme Court has stated that mailings occurring after the receipt of goods obtained by fraud are within the statute if those mailings were designed "to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place." Interesting. In the context of U.S. v. Rogers, it's clear the lulling communications were designed to reassure the creditor that it would be paid eventually, that is as a promise of some future action. It's not clear to me that is a good analogy for the Armstrong situation. Do you think Armstrong's protestations of innocence during 2004-2010 will be viewed as having been designed to postpone fraud complaints from the US Postal Service? If so Armstrong must be a very prescient man, as before 2010 I think hardly anyone but he would have realized that fraud charges were even a possibility. I think this one will have to be argued by real lawyers; so far your examples are not to the point of my question. Fredmaster Ben is not accredited to give legal advice on the Internets |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
BLafferty wrote:
IMO, Lance is toast Did he always fall on the buttered side until he broke his collar bone ? |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On 11/2/2010 3:58 AM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote:
On Nov 1, 1:56 pm, wrote: On 11/1/2010 2:50 PM, Fredmaster of Brainerd wrote: On Nov 1, 9:00 am, wrote: On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote: Lulling: In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).* Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court. Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim. I asked for a case in which the public protestation of innocence was interpreted as a material part of the conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute of limitations. These examples don't show that. A mailing of fictitious acceptances would be like getting a statement from your investment in Bernie Madoff's hedge fund - I have no quibble with its interpretation as a significant part of a conspiracy to commit fraud. A private assurance from Madoff that the business was on the up and up could also be a significant part of his conspiracy. Are you truly dumb as a post? Let me paraphrase the precedent announced by the Supreme Court so that you may more readily apprehend its meaning. "Thus, post-procurement of multi-year sponsorship electronic(wire)transmissions to web sites, blogs, text messages, emails etc. that were designed to *lull* the victim into a false sense of security, *postpone inquiries or complaints*, or make the transaction less suspect are in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994). Wait a second. Please don't begin paraphrases with double quote marks and end them with a citation. As is easily verifiable, U.S. v. Rogers contains no mention of sponsorships, web sites, blogs, text messages or emails, which is not surprising since it's from 1993. Your case might be stronger if you stuck with the direct quote from the ruling that you gave earlier. LOL! The law rolls off your back like water off a duck. Also if I have this right, cert was denied by the Supreme Court so the precedent is from the 2nd Circuit, which doesn't really matter (apart from the issue of precedents across different circuits) - except that it's another detail you seem to be exaggerating to make the case. And your inane point is? The citation notes that cert. was denied. There is no representation in the case citation that the Supreme Court decided the case on its merits. As for precedent, only the circuit making the ruling is bound by the decision as precedent, unless the appeal to the Supreme Court was automatic, in which case cert. denied is binding as precedent across all circuits. But, you knew that. However, these are distinct from a public utterance of innocence, directed to no particular person or defrauded entity. Precedent for the use of that as a critical element of conspiracy is what I asked you to exhibit. We are addressing "public" lulling statements of innocence transmitted in furtherance of the mail/wire fraud scheme to defraud. Hmm. From the case cited above http://openjurist.org/9/f3d/1025/uni...tes-v-e-rogers Paragraphs 17 through 19 are probably of interest here. I'll quote paragraph 19, citing the Supreme Court in Grunewald v. U.S. 353 U.S. at 397, 77 S.Ct. at 970 (footnote omitted). Grunewald noted that "a vital distinction must be made between acts of concealment done in furtherance of the main criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of concealment done after these central objectives have been attained, for the purpose only of covering up after the crime." Id. at 405, 77 S.Ct. at 974 (emphasis in original). "Thus, the life of a conspiracy cannot be extended for statute of limitations purposes by acts of concealment occurring after the conspiracy's criminal objectives have been fully accomplished even if those acts are 'done in the context of a mutually understood need for secrecy.' " United States v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir.) (quoting Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402, 77 S.Ct. at 972), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 67, 116 L.Ed.2d 41 (1991). This is followed by paragraph 20 which contains this sentence: In the context of wire fraud, the Supreme Court has stated that mailings occurring after the receipt of goods obtained by fraud are within the statute if those mailings were designed "to lull the victims into a false sense of security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place." Interesting. In the context of U.S. v. Rogers, it's clear the lulling communications were designed to reassure the creditor that it would be paid eventually, that is as a promise of some future action. It's not clear to me that is a good analogy for the Armstrong situation. Do you think Armstrong's protestations of innocence during 2004-2010 will be viewed as having been designed to postpone fraud complaints from the US Postal Service? If so Armstrong must be a very prescient man, as before 2010 I think hardly anyone but he would have realized that fraud charges were even a possibility. I think this one will have to be argued by real lawyers; so far your examples are not to the point of my question. It isn't often in the practice of law that one finds a case on all fours with the one being considered. Hence, the argument above that has so easily rolled off your back. Frankly, your stupidity is at an amazingly high level, even for a non-attorney such as you are. Fredmaster Ben is not accredited to give legal advice on the Internets |
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Armstrong & Exception to Statute of Limitations
On 11/2/2010 12:02 AM, RicodJour wrote:
On Nov 1, 2:50 pm, Fredmaster of wrote: On Nov 1, 9:00 am, wrote: On 11/1/2010 11:50 AM, BLafferty wrote: Lulling: In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings which occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the statute. See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United States, 349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire used after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf. United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze has no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976). It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that use of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen fraudulently obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the services would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. *Thus, post-purchase mailings or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d 1025 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).* Mr. Armstrong's use of various forms or electronic communication to divert suspicion from the use of PEDs by his team and himself, will easily fit into the lulling definition set out by the US Supreme Court. Consider also that, contrary to the assertions of some legal beavers here, it matters not that the victim was not the sharpest tool in the shed, nor does it matter that there was no actual damage to the victim. I asked for a case in which the public protestation of innocence was interpreted as a material part of the conspiracy and thus worthy of extending the statute of limitations. These examples don't show that. Are you for real?! Please don't discourage L'enema from posting his obsession research. It is ever so much more enjoyable than his usual knee-jerk - or is it just jerking? - posting of puerile links that allow him to play holier than thou while self-flagellating his demonic digit to that picture of LANCE naked on his bike. So please, encourage the boy. R You really do have a hard on, RICO. If it lasts more than four hours, seek medical assistance. |
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